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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-JURISDICTION OF A STATE COURT
OVER A FOREIGN CORPORATION-Peninsular Gas Company, a Michigan corporation, brought an action in Missouri against the plaintiff for breach of
contract. A judgment was returned for plaintiff, and plaintiff immediately
filed suit for malicious prosecution and served process on the president of
the corporation who was in Missouri for the prior trial. On a motion to
quash, held, sustained. Under the due process clause of the United States
Constitution, the court had no right to assume jurisdiction. Defendant
corporation was not doing business in Missouri, for bringing a prior lawsuit was a single isolated act and was not a part of its usual and customary
business. Collar v. Peninsular Gas Company, (Mo. 1956) 295 S.W. (2d) 88.
A satisfactory test for determining when state courts can exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations must reconcile certain conflicting factors.
These factors include the inconvenience to the corporation, the location of
witnesses and other evidence, the physical and legal risks to citizens of the
state because of the activities of the corporation, and the benefit to the
corporation from being in the state.1 Each state may reconcile these factors

1 See 104 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 381 (1955) for an extended treatment of these considerations. See also O'Connor and Goff, "Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over Non•
Residents: the Illinois Revised Practice Act," 31 NoTR.E DAME LAWYER 223 (1956) for a
defense of the new Illinois statute concerning jurisdiction, and a discussion of this balancing
of interests.
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in accordance with the considerations that it regards as significant, and
may set up its own jurisdictional tests, limited only by the due process
requirement of the United States Constitution.2 The constitutional extent
of a state's power over foreign corporations is a question that has frequently
been litigated. The early cases,3 following the rule applied in determining
jurisdiction over natural persons, required that the corporation be present
within the state. The difficulty of ascertaining the presence of a corporation
in a state was resolved by requiring that the corporation be "doing business" within the state.4 The Supreme Court's decision in International
Shoe Company v. State of W ashington,5 the most significant recent case
dealing with this question, leaves some doubt, however, as to whether "doing business" is still a prerequisite to jurisdiction. In that case the nonresident corporation had no permanent place of business within the state,
but did have salesmen in the state who exhibited samples and solicited
orders. The state court's jurisdiction was upheld in an action to recover
state unemployment compensation contributions £or which the corporation
became liable as employer of the salesmen. The Court, after reviewing
prior decisions, concluded that no violation of due process would result
from a state court's assuming jurisdiction over a foreign corporation so long
as there were certain "minimum contacts" between the corporation and the
state. Just what contacts will comprise the necessary minimum is not obvious from the broadly-phrased opinion. Later interpretations of the decision by state and lower federal courts have produced two views. The first,
followed in the principal case, regards the International Shoe case as merely
an extension of the "doing business" test, and looks primarily to the factual
situation in that case, viz., the fact that there were continuing acts within
the state in pursuance of the usual business of the corporation.6 The second
view, resting primarily on the language of the decision, treats the International Shoe case as having_ done away with the "doing business" test, and
instead allows jurisdiction whenever acts done within a state create the
liability which gives rise to the litigation.1 While the United States Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the constitutionality of this second
2 Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc.,
(7th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 908. Missouri law provides no particular standard for determining jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1952) §506.150 (3). See
principal case at 93 for basis of this decision under the Missouri and United States Constitutions.
s Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. '714 at 733 (1877). See STOMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d
ed., 7, 93-100 (1951); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., 172, 186 (1949).
4 St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See 20 C.J.S. 45-62 (1940).
5 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See McBaine, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: Actions
Arising out of Acts Done Within the Forum," 34 CALIF. L. REv. 331 (1946); 104 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 381 (1955); 12 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 127 (1957).
6 Goldstein v. Chicago R. I.&: P.R. Co., (W.D.N.Y. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 671 at 678.
7 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 654; Smyth
v. Twin State Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. (2d) 664 (1951); S. Howes Co. v. W. P.
Milling Co., (Okla. 1954) 277 P. (2d) 655; Duraladd Products v. Superior Court, 134 Cal.
App. (2d) 226, 285 P. (2d) 699 (1955).
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interpretation, it seems unlikely that it would be held to violate due process. Statutes in several states have expressly given their courts power to
assume jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of a single liability-creating act.8 Reason itself seems to require that a state court be
permitted to take jurisdiction of a controversy that arises directly out of
acts within the state by agents of a foreign corporation where those acts
are the primary issues of the litigation. In the principal case the suit for
malicious prosecution arose directly from acts done within the state. All
witnesses and evidence were present in Missouri, and notice was served on
the president of the corporation within the state. A liability-creating act
was done within the state, and under the second view of the International
Shoe case, the Missouri court would be permitted to take jurisdiction. Apart
from the possibility of jurisdiction based on the liability-creating act, it
might also be argued that the defendant corporation consented to jurisdiction of the Missouri courts. When a person brings a law suit within a state
he submits himself to the jurisdiction of that state's courts for any crossaction or set-off arising from that suit.9 In Adam v. Saenger10 the Supreme
Court upheld jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on a cross-action filed
three years after the original complaint. This suit arose in California
where a cross-action has the position of an independent suit, and judgment
may be obtained without waiting for the results of the original plaintiff's
claim. The Court said the foreign corporation's voluntary act in demanding
justice made it reasonable to treat the corporation as submitting to the
court's jurisdiction for all purposes which justice requires. This implied
consent concept might be extended to subject a foreign corporation which
has brought suit within a state without probable cause to the jurisdiction
of the courts of that state for purposes of determining the corporation's
liability for malicious prosecution. The Missouri court in the principal
case could have found jurisdiction either by a theory based on the existence
of a liability-creating act or under a theory of implied consent. Since service of process was entirely proper, the claim of its citizens for malicious
prosecution could have been resolved economically and expeditiously. In
view of the current trend for allowing broader jurisdiction, provided ade-

s Vt. Stat. (1947) §1562; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 23, §88 (d); Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1955) c. 110, §17.
9 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 82 (1951); CONFLICTS REsTATEMENT §§83, 88
(1934).
10 Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). In Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283
U.S. 398 (1931), a counter-claim was allowed against a foreign corporation although it was
treated as a separate action. Holmes, J., speaking for the court, said at 400, " ... [P]laintiff being already in court qua plaintiff by his own voluntary act, it is reasonable to treat
him as being there for all the purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his
presence." Gordy v. Levison &: Co., 157 Ga. 670, 122 S.E. 234 (1924), and Wachovia Bank
&: Trust v. Jones, 166 Ga. 747, 144 S.E. 256 (1928), allowed jurisdiction over foreign corporations for independent equity actions based on prior actions at law brought by the
corporations.
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quate notice is given,11 the Missouri Supreme Court probably has taken an
unreasonably narrow view of the limits of due process as a test of jurisdiction.

Robert L. Knauss, S.Ed.

11 See note 1 supra. See also Joiner, "Let's H;i.ve Michigan Torts Decided in Michigan
Courts," 31 MICH. ST. B. J. 5 Gan. 1952).

